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Britain’s EU membership has been a key issue in the UK’s general election campaign, with David
Cameron proposing to hold an in/out referendum before the end of 2017 should he remain Prime
Minister. Against the backdrop of the election, Nauro F Campos writes on the extent to which the
UK has beneﬁtted from EU membership, and what the likely eﬀects would be if the country were to
leave during the next parliament.
Whether a Labour or Conservative government emerges victorious from the 2015 UK general
election on Thursday, it is abundantly clear that the European question will not go away. A
Conservative-led government is likely to deliver an in/out referendum by 2017. A Labour-led government will have to
count on popular support to rebuild the UK-EU relationship. Scholars still lack a solid understating of the
magnitudes, drivers and dynamics of the beneﬁts and costs of EU membership. Demand for such inputs is unlikely
to fade during the next parliament.
Although the term may now be widely understood, a ‘Brexit’ refers to the possible exit of the United Kingdom from
the European Union. This was unthinkable a few years ago. It is an event without precedent: no country has ever left
the EU. Current commentary is still attempting to grasp a number of issues surrounding what a Brexit would mean in
practice and many aspects of this debate remain diﬃcult to understand. Two questions seem of particular relevance:
how would the UK’s situation be diﬀerent from the status quo if the country had never joined the EU, and what is
likely to happen if the UK does decide to leave the EU in the near future?
What if the UK had never joined?
Consider for a minute that the UK had not joined the European Integration project in 1973. What would have been
the economic and political consequences of such a decision? Would the UK be richer or poorer today? Would the
share of Europe in the UK’s trade be smaller or larger? Would the UK be receiving less or more foreign investment?
How would migration ﬂows into the UK diﬀer in terms of absolute numbers or in terms of average skills?
There are three main issues that make these very important questions rather diﬃcult to answer. They are the nature
of European integration, the uniqueness of the UK’s economic performance after the War, and the particularly bad
timing for joining. Eurosceptics like to claim that the UK only signed up for an economic union rather than a political
union: that is, just for the Common (later Single) Market. This is not the case. The Treaty of Rome is the outcome of
a battle of models, namely a free trade area versus a customs union. Although the technical diﬀerence is simple (a
common external tariﬀ), setting such a common tariﬀ requires institutions, processes and procedures, and thus
entails a very large political step.
This has been clear since at least 1961, when Bela Balassa published his work on the theory of economic
integration. The Treaty of Rome enshrined a customs union as the dominant model, as opposed to a free trade
area. The UK, favouring the latter approach, founded an alternative organisation to champion this model (EFTA) but
applied to join the customs union model (EC) twice before succeeding at the third attempt in 1973. European
integration has therefore been deep from the outset: it is an economic and political process and this makes it
inherently diﬃcult to answer the ‘what if’ question as to the economic beneﬁts, economic costs, political beneﬁts,
and political costs. Complicating matters further is the recognition that politics and economics interact: sometimes
complementing each other, but at other times doing the opposite.
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A second reason why it is diﬃcult to assess what would have occurred if the UK had decided not to join is the unique
nature of the country’s economic performance in the post-war period. Indeed, it is almost impossible to ﬁnd a single
meaningful experience or country to compare the UK with during this time. It was one of only a handful of economies
that actually grew during the war, to the extent that in 1945 the UK was once again one of the richest countries in
Europe. In 1946 GDP per capita in the UK was 70 per cent higher than the average GDP per capita in the six
founding EU members.
By 1961, however, this had declined to 20 per cent and when the UK joined in 1973 it was 9 per cent lower than the
average in the six founding members. While we are used to speaking of something being beneﬁcial if it leads to
improvements, in this case the main beneﬁt is that the deterioration stopped and the country’s situation stabilised.
Another important diﬃculty in assessing how the UK’s fortunes would have changed outside the EU is the timing of
the accession. It is perhaps stating the obvious, but 1973 was not a great year from an economic perspective. The
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the ﬁrst oil shock heralded a period of economic and political instability. It
could be argued that by then all of the low hanging fruit from integration had already been harvested, with those
aspects left (for instance the Common Agricultural Policy) not being quite as tasteful. This makes it even more
important to recognise the beneﬁts of accession for what they were: the real contribution of joining was not an
increase in growth, but that membership helped to freeze the gap between the UK and other European countries,
which prior to 1973 had been growing.
How would a Brexit aﬀect the UK today?
The other important issue concerning a Brexit is what
the likely eﬀects would be if the UK pursued this
course of action today. This is deeply uncertain, but
an obvious prerequisite is to know under which terms
and conditions a Brexit would be likely to take place.
Given the lack of precedent, it is misguided to expect
the EU to oﬀer generous terms. Current discussions
over the so called ‘Norwegian option’ tend to ignore
that, in general, EFTA membership does not
automatically yield EEA membership (the latter
meaning access to the Single Market without the
need to participate in the EU’s political integration
project). Moreover, such discussions also ignore the
fact that Norway’s deal was both unexpected and
unique – and hence unlikely to be on oﬀer again.
The two other dimensions above are also likely to be crucial. Whereas the UK’s original entry into the EEC took
place against the backdrop of a successful European economy, the current Brexit discussion is occurring in the
context of economic turmoil. However if the worst of the crisis has passed and Europe starts growing again will a
Brexit still look attractive? Nobody can know at this point what will happen, but with a new government about to enter
oﬃce demand will no doubt increase for better and more robust evidence on the costs and beneﬁts of EU
membership.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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